Abstract. To achieve privacy protection on facial image retrieval systems, we propose a method of encrypting facial images with a key produced from facial features. Because facial features vary even for the same person, it is not recommended to use facial features as the cryptographic key. Therefore, we propose a method for generating a key by quantizing the facial features based on entropy. In our experiment, we applied the proposed method to a public facial image database, and evaluated the system performance and integrity by calculating the false acceptance rate and the false rejection rate.
Introduction
Surveillance cameras have been widely used to assist with criminal investigations. It is therefore useful to build a retrieval system for finding suspects from recorded videos (Fig. 1) . Instead of using texts such as dates and locations, it is preferred to use facial images as queries for retrieval, because images provide more information than offered by texts and enable direct comparisons to be made between the query images and the facial images in the recorded videos.
Because surveillance cameras capture images of people in public places, the faces of not only suspects but also innocent citizens get captured. In order to protect the privacy of innocent citizens, only authorized persons (e.g., detectives) should be able to use the system. Even if an authorization mechanism is introduced in the system, the recorded videos may be inadvertently leaked owing to information security crises, thereby compromising the privacy of these people. To prevent this occurrence, encryption techniques should be incorporated into the system. In this study, we aim to realize a privacy protection framework for the system. In section 2, we explain the encryption method using facial features that generate the encryption key. Moreover, we highlight the problem associated with the application of conventional encryption methods to this system. In section 3, we propose a suitable quantization method, and in section 4, we explain the results of the experiment. In section 5, we give our conclusions. 
Encryption of facial images using a cryptographic key
Encryption prevents non-authorized users from freely browsing specific data. To decrypt an encrypted data, a cryptographic key is required, which must be possessed by authorized users only. In this study, we propose a method for encrypting facial images using facial features extracted from the image to generate the cryptographic key.
Facial features used for personal identification are different for each person. Using these features, we can produce a key corresponding to each individual. This therefore requires both privacy protection and secure encryption. Because we can produce the key from the facial image of each person, we can also produce the key from the query image in order to decrypt the image of the same person in the database. Therefore, it is not necessary to store the cryptographic keys after 
Problem associated with previously developed methods
Several methods have been proposed for producing the cryptographic key from facial features [1] [2] [3] . Facial features usually vary under the influence of illumination and variations in expressions. This would result in different keys being generated from the facial features of the same person, or the same key being generated from facial features of different persons. To solve this problem, previous methods generated a stable key from facial features of each person. Of these previous methods, we focus on the methods that quantize the facial features to generate a stable key [2] [3] .
These methods generate a binary string from the facial features and use it as a key. This binary string is generated by quantizing and coding a facial feature independent of each dimension based on bins. The bins are determined by analyzing the distributions within the facial features. These methods enable the same key to be generated from facial features that vary within the same bins.
We apply the idea of quantizing facial features to generate a key. If an adequate quantization is performed, the same key can be obtained from the facial images of the same person and different keys can be obtained from the features of different persons (Fig. 3) . However, an inadequate quantization will lead to degradation of the retrieval performance. Thus, it is important to perform an adequate quantization and several methods have been proposed for this so far. In [2] , the authors separated the mean of the background distribution in each dimension of the feature space. However, this method can significantly degrade the retrieval performance because it does not consider the feature distribution of each person. Chen et al. [3] proposed a quantization method in which each bin is determined on the basis of the likelihood ratio between each person s feature distribution and the background distribution. This method prepares different bins for each user of the system by learning facial features of all users. Although this user-specific quantization approach achieves a higher retrieval performance, it cannot prepare an adequate quantization for unspecified persons. It is therefore not ideal to apply this method to our system. We therefore need another quantization method that is applicable to unspecified persons.
Facial Feature Quantization for Encryption
As described above, it is preferable to consider the feature distributions of each person when setting bins in order to achieve high retrieval performance. Moreover, it is preferable to set common bins for use by unspecified persons.
Quantization based on entropy
We propose a quantization method that determines the common bins applicable to unspecified persons using the facial image database as the prior knowledge of the distributions of facial features. We use the entropy as the evaluation value that determines the bins. The entropy takes a higher value when the facial features of different persons vary in the same bin. We calculate the entropy as follows. In the ith dimension of the facial feature, we define t 
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where I denotes the set of persons in C. The value of the entropy p(x; C (2), the expected value of entropy in the ith dimension is calculated as follows:
The term
refers to the probability of obtaining a specific number of facial images for each person.
According to the entropy, we incrementally determine the threshold of bins as follows:
1. Start from the empty set of thresholds. 2. The new threshold for bins is defined as t. Let K i be the number of bins that divide C intoĈ i k (k = 1, . . . , K i + 1) by adding t. First, we calculate the expected value of the entropy after adding t as follows:
whereN i k denotes the total number of facial images inĈ i k . Using (3) and (4), we calculate the entropy gain Gain i as follows.
When there is a large difference in the number of facial images between groups (that is, most of the facial images belong to a single bin), Gain We select the threshold of bins for quantization so that the entropy gain is maximized. 
Experiment

System implementation
We implemented the cryptographic system for registering and referring to the facial image database. To obtain a hash value from the cryptographic key, we adopted the cryptographic hash function SHA-1 [4] . We also adopted passwordprotected zip compression with advanced encryption standard (AES) encryption [5] , and used the cryptographic key as the password.
Experiment and evaluation
We examined the performance and reliability of the proposed method. For the experiment, we used a public facial image database CAS PEAL [6] . First, we select one facial image from the database and register other images to our system. Then, we query the system for the selected image, and evaluate whether the images of the same person are retrieved. For evaluation purposes, we used the false acceptance rate (FAR) and false rejection rate (FRR) as criteria. In this experiment, we calculate FAR as the probability of the system to incorrectly retrieve images of other people. FAR indicates the security of the system. Moreover, we used FRR as the probability of retrieval omission, where the system fails to retrieve the images of the same person whose image is in the query. Thus, FRR indicates the retrieval performance of the system. Hence, we evaluated the performance and the reliability of the system using FAR and FRR.
However, FAR and FRR vary depending on the degree of quantization. Thus, we calculated the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve of FAR and FRR for various degrees of quantization. The ROC curve is the criterion usually used in studies of personal authentication. In general, the closer the ROC curve is to zero, the higher will be the performance and reliability of the method.
We conducted two experiments as follows. In the first experiment, we used 714 images (100 persons, about seven variations in expressions of each person) in the database for both determining the thresholds of the bins and evaluation. In the second experiment, we used the same dataset for determining the thresholds of the bins and used another 5,194 images (1,024 persons, about five variations in ornaments of each person) for evaluation. We evaluated the reliability and performance of the system in the first experiment, and the versatility in the second experiment.
Results and Discussion
The results of the first experiment are shown in Table 1 (FAR and FRR) and Fig. 1 (ROC curve) .
In general, when the length of the binary code is more than 64 bits, the key is computationally secure. Thus, we selected the quantization in which the length of the binary code b(m) = log 2 m generated from the facial features is more than 64, where m denotes the number of divisions
The FAR obtained in all quantizations satisfied the above constraint condition; the FAR was 0%. We therefore selected the quantization for which FRR was the lowest. We present these experiment results in Table 2 . From FRR in Table 2 , we can retrieve 35% of the images of the same person shown in the query image. Because the proposed system collects images captured by surveillance cameras, it is expected that there will be multiple images of the same person within the database. Therefore, even if the FRR is about 35%, it can achieve satisfactory performance. Moreover, 0% of FAR implies that the system rarely retrieves the images of other persons. Therefore, the reliability of the system is sufficiently high against the spillage of the database. Table 2 shows that the FRR for b(m) = 64 increases by about 11% in the second experiment when compared to the first experiment. This implies that the retrieval performance is degraded for unknown datasets, but it maintains a certain minimum retrieval performance.
Experimental results show that there is a trade-off between FAR and FRR. When b(m) is large and FRR is high, FAR is low. Therefore, if we need to enhance privacy protection, we should increase b(m). In contrast, when b(m) is small and FRR is low, FAR is high. This suggested that if we want to retrieve all the possible images of criminals, we should reduce b(m). Thus we can appropriately choose the parameter b(m) based on the requests made for the system.
Conclusion
To increase the efficiency of criminal investigations and to enhance privacy protection, we proposed a method for encrypting facial images in a retrieval system. This system enables a user to query a facial image and retrieve the facial images of the same person from the database. Because the database will include facial images of good citizens as well, we proposed a privacy protection framework that restricts the users to view only retrieved images, preventing them from freely browsing other images. To produce cryptographic keys for unspecified persons, we proposed a method for producing the key from the facial image itself. During the registration step, we produce the key from the facial image and encrypt the image with the key. In the reference step, we produce the key from the query image and retrieve the encrypted images that have been encrypted with the same key. This method has a disadvantage in that if we use facial features directly as the cryptographic key, it is difficult to reproduce the same key even for facial images of the same person, because facial features are not stable owing to illumination and variations in expression. To increase the stability of the key that is produced, we proposed a quantization method that is based on entropy. This method determines the bin that maximizes entropy for each dimension of the feature space. In the experiments, we examined the performance and reliability of the system using a public facial image database. We used FAR and FRR as the criteria. The results of the experiment showed that FRR was about 35% and FAR was 0% with a higher reliability.
